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In this paper, we consider a duopoly with product differentiation and examine the interaction 
between merger and innovation incentives. The analysis reveals that a merger tends to dis-
courage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently low. This result holds whether 
or not side payments between firms are allowed. When side payments are permitted, a bilat-
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1. Introduction 
 There is a large literature on mergers among firms competing in a homogeneous good 
market. The aim of this literature is to provide a performance evaluation of the merger deci-
sion by looking at the profits of the insider and outsider firms. A key finding is that a merger 
would be profitable if it includes more than 2/3 of the firms in the industry, also known as the 
80-percent rule (Salant et al., 1983). Nonetheless, relatively little is known about the condi-
tions under which a merger is profitable when firms invest in R&D, as well as whether firms 
will be more or less willing to innovate post-merger. In this paper we examine these two is-
sues systematically by developing a unique model of endogenous merger and innovation de-
cisions.  
The current study is motivated by real market observations. The Boeing Company is 
active in the industries of commercial aircrafts, defence systems and aerospace, and has expe-
rienced several mergers during the recent past. For example, at the end of 1996, it merged 
with the Rockwell International Corporation’s aerospace and defence units. The aircraft units 
were renamed Boeing North American, Inc., and operated as a Boeing subsidiary. On August 
1, 1997, Boeing and its North American component merged with McDonnell-Douglas. These 
mergers are considered as horizontal as they occurred between firms with ‘overlapping’ 
products (in principle, commercial aircrafts). Looking at the R&D expenditure of the Boeing 
company (as a percentage of total sales),1 we notice that they were significantly reduced after 
the first merger in 1996. 2 In some other instances, however, horizontal mergers may not be 
proposed at all, as is the case of Unilever and Procter and Gamble (P&G).3 
These empirical observations inspire two questions. First, if a horizontal merger is real-
ized, will the merged firm invest in new technologies – and if so under which conditions? 
Second, is there an economic explanation – in addition to potential antitrust concerns – of 
why firms operating in substitute product markets may prefer to stay independent? 
Providing an answer to these questions would contribute to three strands of literature. 
First, it would contribute to the literature on the effects of increased concentration on R&D 
spending. This literature dates back to Schumpeter’s (1943) conjecture that the creation of 
                                                 
1 See Figure A1 in the Appendix. 
2 It is worth mentioning that R&D expenditure would presumably increase after a conglomerate merger. (See, 
for instance, the merger of Boeing with Hughes Electronics in Figure A1). Analyzing this type of merger is not 
very interesting, though, as “merger” is generally preferred over “no merger” in complement product markets. 
3 Note that the subsidiary of P&G, which specializes in personal care products for women, decided to merge 
with Gillette, which specializes in personal care products for men. This type of merger is classified as conglom-
erate. 
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monopolies can be tolerated as long as monopolistic firms have a larger capacity to carry out 
R&D. Arrow (1962), by contrast, showed that perfect competition implies stronger innova-
tion incentives compared to monopoly. This result stems from a replacement effect: while a 
firm under perfect competition is only able to cover its costs, the monopolist would ‘replace’ 
part of its existing profit with a larger one. Arrow’s (1962) seminar contribution was later ex-
tended to oligopolistic markets representing an intermediate form of competition (e.g. Del-
bono and Denicolo, 1990; Bester and Petrakis, 1993; Yi, 1999). Building on earlier studies, 
Belleflamme and Vergari (2011) developed a unifying framework in order to examine how 
the intensity of competition affects innovation incentives. They showed that different dimen-
sions of competition, including the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation and 
the nature of competition, affect firms’ incentives to innovate in a variety of diverse ways. 
What this implies is that, under certain conditions, highest innovation incentives can be at-
tained under any form of market structure. 
Our study further contributes to the literature which looks at firms’ willingness to invest 
in cost-reducing R&D in oligopolistic markets (e.g. d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Ka-
mien et al., 1992; Poyago-Theotoky, 1995, 1999; Atallah, 2005; Falvey et al., 2013; Manasa-
kis et al., 2014).4 Such analysis departs from Arrow’s (1962) approach and that of subsequent 
contributions (e.g. Belleflamme and Vergari, 2011) by relaxing the assumption that there is a 
sole innovator who cannot be imitated by competitors. Put another way, competing innova-
tions are possible, and given that R&D investments take place before firms make their output 
decisions, there are strategic effects emanating from innovation. The main focus of this litera-
ture is on a comparison between non-cooperative R&D with the case in which firms coordi-
nate their R&D activities to maximize their joint profits (for example, through a research 
joint venture or an R&D cartel). Like the earlier studies, we consider the case in which firms 
invest independently in R&D. However, the issues examined in prior studies differ from 
those motivating us here. Rather than focusing on the comparison between R&D cooperation 
and R&D competition, we are interested in firms’ innovation incentives when they integrate 
with each other through a merger. Our results have an Arrowian flavor in the sense that a 
merger-to-monopoly tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently 
low. 
                                                 
4 Other related strands of literature investigate R&D financing of public firms (e.g. Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; 
Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006; Gil Molto, et al., 2011; Kesavayuth and Zikos, 2013; Lee and Tomaru, 2017) 
and firms’ incentives to engage in R&D collaboration through networks (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González, 
2001; Zikos, 2010; Kesavayuth et al., 2016).  
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There is also a growing literature on the relationship between mergers and innovation in 
imperfectly competitive markets (e.g. Davidson and Ferrett, 2007; Matsushima et al., 2013; 
Cabolis et al., 2016; Atallah, 2016; Miyagiwa and Wan, 2016).5 For example, revisiting the 
merger paradox, Miyagiwa and Wan (2016) show that, in a Cournot oligopoly where firms 
invest in R&D, a merger can be profitable even if it does not include more than 2/3 of the 
firms in the industry. Matsushima et al. (2013) show that the decision to merge or not may 
depend on the R&D cost as well as the extent of heterogeneity between firms. Mukherjee and 
Chowdhury (2013) consider a duopoly in order to examine when a merger is socially desira-
ble. They find that the social desirability of a merger is determined by two key elements of 
the R&D environment; the effectiveness of the patent system and the efficiency of the R&D 
technology. 
The current study contributes to this literature by bringing some new insights into the 
interplay between merger and innovation incentives in a duopoly with differentiated goods. 
The analysis reveals that, consistent with some stylized facts from the commercial aircraft 
industry, a merger tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently 
low. This result holds whether or not side payments between firms are allowed. When side 
payments are permitted, a bilateral merger-to-monopoly is always profitable, a standard result 
in the literature. When side payments are not permitted, however, we identify conditions on 
the investment cost, the degree of product differentiation and the new technology efficiency 
under which a merger is profitable. At the same time, we are able to show that when two 
conditions are met – the efficiency of the new technology is relatively high and the invest-
ment cost is below a certain level – the firms would prefer to stay independent, although they 
would enjoy significant market power through a merger. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model. Section 3 characteriz-
es its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Section 4 extends the analysis in various ways. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Model 
Consider an industry consisting of two firms with the same initial technology. Each 
firm can alter its existing technology by adopting a new technology at a fixed cost of 	ܨ ൒ 0. 
ܨ is a firm’s sunk cost which can be viewed as an R&D investment for getting access to the 
                                                 
5 For exceptional studies in the general field of mergers see, for example, recent work by Liu et al. (2015), Liu 
and Wang (2015) and Gelves and Heywood (2016). 
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new technology. Thus firm i’s cost function can be written out as ܥ௜ሺݍ௜ሻ ൌ ݇௜ݍ௜ଶ ൅ ܨ௜, where 
ݍ௜ is output and ݇௜ is the production technology; that is, a higher level of ݇௜ implies a lower 
level of productive efficiency. To model firm i’s decision of whether or not to adopt the new 
technology, we follow Calabuig and González-Maestre (2002).6 Specifically, if firm i decides 
to purchase the new technology available7 then ݇௜ ൌ ݁, for ݁ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ and ܨ௜ ൌ ߳ ൐ 0; where-
as if it decides to stay with the same (initial) technology then ݇௜ ൌ 1 and ܨ௜ ൌ 0. This means 
that the effect of the new technology is to decrease the slope of the innovator’s marginal cost 
curve, ݉ܿ௜ሺݍ௜ሻ ൌ 2݇௜ݍ௜, for ݇௜ ൌ ݁ ൏ 1. The use of a quadratic cost function allows the sec-
ond order conditions of all maximization problems to hold and solutions to be interior, thus 
permitting sensible predictions for merger.8 
Each firm faces the linear (inverse) demand function 	ܲ൫ݍ௜, ݍ௝൯ ൌ ܽ െ ݍ௜ െ ߛݍ௝ , for 
݅ ് ݆ and ݅, ݆ ∈ ሼ1,2ሽ, where ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ denotes the degree of product substitutability; namely 
the higher ߛ is the closer substitutes the products are. The objective of firm i is to maximize 
its profits ߨ௜ ൌ ܲ൫ݍ௜, ݍ௝൯ݍ௜ െ ܥ௜ሺݍ௜ሻ. 
We consider the following three-stage game. 
Stage 1: The firms decide simultaneously whether to merge or not. This implies that 
the strategy set in Stage 1 is defined as ݏ ൌ ሼܯ,ܰሽ, where M denotes the case of a merger 
and N the case in which a merger does not occur. The merged firm then becomes a multi-
plant monopoly (with two divisions producing differentiated products). We assume that no 
side payments are permitted between firms and the merged firm is constrained to make the 
same investment decision for both its constituent divisions.9 This means that a merger is vol-
untary in the sense that it can only be realized under a unanimous and symmetric agreement. 
                                                 
6 Like Calabuig and González-Maestre (2002), we consider firms’ innovation incentives but instead of focusing 
on how centralized versus decentralized labor unions affect these incentives, we look at the interplay between 
merger and innovation decisions. 
7 When firms decide to adopt a new technology, there are two possible situations one may think of. The first 
possibility is outsourcing, that is to purchase a new technology available or to finance an external lab in order to 
produce it. The second possibility is to make use of an internal research lab (if there already exists one). Since in 
our model the new efficiency level is expected prior to the respective decision, the total cost of the new technol-
ogy can be estimated and so it is considered to be a fixed amount F. 
8 It is worth noting that the quadratic cost function implies decreasing returns to scale (increasing marginal cost) 
for output production, as well as decreasing returns to R&D, consistent with the previous studies in this area (e.g. 
Atallah, 2016; Mukherjee and Chowdhury, 2013; Calabuig and González Maestre, 2002). 
9 We relax these assumptions in Section 4. It is worth noting that, although cross-subsidization is pretty wide-
spread within multi-product firms, agreeing upon side payments may often be difficult. According to Peck and 
Temple (2002), one reason for this might be that firms have different preferences. For example, firms may differ 
in their discount rates and, if one firm happens to be more (or less) future-oriented than the other, divergence of 
opinion is likely. But reaching an agreement can be an even more delicate matter in industries characterized by 
rapid technological change. In such environments, there is uncertainty surrounding a variety of future conditions 
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 Stage 2: The firms (or the merged firm) make their technology choices simultaneously; 
to purchase the new technology or stay with the old one. The strategy set in Stage 2, condi-
tioned on the Stage 1 decisions, is then defined as ݎ ൌ ሼܫ, ܦ|ݏሽ, where I stands for “invest” 
and D for “do not invest”. Moreover, we assume that the new technology is product-specific. 
This means that if a merger occurs, the two divisions need to pay the technology cost F indi-
vidually. We note that the decision of whether to merge or not precedes the innovation deci-
sion as the former is typically a longer-term issue. 
 Stage 3: The firms (or the merged firm) select their output quantities. 
The game is solved by backward induction to obtain its subgame perfect Nash equilib-
ria (SPNE). For contrast, and to allow comparison with the findings of our baseline model, 
we also extend the analysis to consider the role of asymmetric technology choices of the 
merged firm, side payments, complement goods, price competition in the product market, a 
reversal of the timing of the merger and innovation decisions, spillover effects, and a larger 
number of firms. 
 
3. Equilibria characterization 
In the last stage of the game, if the firms have merged (s = M) then for given innovation 
decisions ݇௜ and ௝݇, the equilibrium output of division i is 
ݍ௜ெ,௥௥ ൌ ௔ሺଵା௞ೕିఊሻଶሺଵା௞೔ା௞ೕା௞೔௞ೕିఊమሻ         (1) 
where ‘ݎݎ’ stands for the technology choices of divisions i and j, respectively. If the firms 
have decided to stay independent (s = N), however, the equilibrium output is 
ݍ௜ே,௥௥ ൌ ௔ሺଶାଶ௞ೕିఊሻସሺଵା௞೔ሻሺଵା௞ೕሻିఊమ         (2) 
where ‘ݎݎ’ respectively identifies the technology choices of firms i and j. 
In the second stage, firms make their innovation decisions strategically, aiming to alter 
competition at the output selection stage. Given the firms’ strategies in Stage 1, there are two 
possible subgames: the “merger” subgame and the “independent firms” subgame. 
                                                                                                                                                        
and therefore firms may disagree on things like production costs, demand, and product lines. In addition, rapid 
technological change means that the direction and pace of innovation are largely unknown at the time of negoti-
ations between firms, making it difficult to agree upon suitable transfers (see Peck and Temple, 2002). 
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3.1 Merger subgame 
Using Table A1’s payoffs in the Appendix, the merged firm will adopt the new tech-
nology if ߎெ,ூூ ൐ ߎெ,஽஽. Define ߳ெభ to be the value of the fixed technology cost ߳ such that 
ߎெ,ூூ ൌ ߎெ,஽஽. Straightforward calculation yields 
߳ெభ ൌ ௔మሺଵି௘ሻସሺଶାఊሻሺଵା௘ାఊሻ .    (3) 
Hence, if the innovation costs are sufficiently low, 	0 ൏ ߳	 ൏ ߳ெభ , it is intuitive that the 
merged firm will innovate; whereas if  ߳ ൐ ߳ெభ, the merged firm will not innovate. 
3.2  Independent firms subgame 
Here each firm has two strategies available, ݎ ൌ ሼܫ, ܦሽ, meaning that there are four 
candidate equilibria; two symmetric, ሺܰ, ܫܫሻ and ሺܰ, ܦܦሻ, and two asymmetric, ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ and 
ሺܰ, ܦܫሻ. Using the equilibrium outcomes in Table A2 of the Appendix, define ߳ேభ to be the 
value of ߳ such that ߨ௜ே,ூூ ൌ ߨ௜ே,஽ூ, and ߳ேమ to be the value of ߳ such that ߨ௜ே,஽஽ ൌ ߨ௜ே,ூ஽. This 
leads to 
߳ேభ ൌ ௔మሺଵି௘ሻሺଷଶሺଵା௘ሻయିఊరሻሺଶାଶ௘ାఊሻమሺ଼ା଼௘ିఊమሻమ          (4) 
߳ேమ ൌ ௔మሺଵି௘ሻሺଵଶ଼ሺଵା௘ሻିఊరሻሺସାఊሻమሺ଼ା଼௘ିఊమሻమ .         (5) 
Comparing ߳ேభ and ߳ேమ, we obtain ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ேమ. It follows that if ߳ ൐ ߳ேమ, then both firms will 
not innovate and ሺܦ, ܦሻ is the equilibrium outcome; if ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ ൏ ߳ேమ, only one firm inno-
vates and ሺܦ, ܫሻ, ሺܫ, ܦሻ are the outcomes; and if  ߳ ൏ ߳ேభ, both firms innovate and ሺܫ, ܫሻ is the 
outcome. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding arises for intermediate values of the investment 
cost, in which case the firms’ investment decisions differ. This follows from the fact that the 
new technology transforms a firm into a more aggressive competitor, as it can now price at a 
lower rate and attract more of the rival firm’s customers; a business stealing effect. Thus, if a 
firm anticipates its rival to innovate, it will not itself adopt the same strategy when the in-
vestment cost is intermediate – as a means of relaxing competition in the product market. It is 
worth noting that when the products are independent (ߛ ൌ 0), the firms do not compete in the 
product market. This implies that the role of an asymmetric outcome regarding technology 
choices, which was to reduce the intensity of competition, is no longer relevant. In this case, 
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the critical values of the fixed technology cost are equal (߳ேభ ൌ ߳ேమ), meaning that an asym-
metric outcome vanishes. 
3.3  Incentives for merger 
Comparing the critical values of the investment cost, we obtain the following ranking.10 
Lemma 1  
0 ൏ ߳ெభ ൏ ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ேమ. 
Lemma 1 allows us to characterize the SPNE of the entire game by comparing the prof-
it of the candidate equilibria with the aid of the following table. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of the different subgames 
Conditions Merger subgame Independent firms subgame 
߳ ൐ ߳ேమ  ሺܯ, ܦܦሻ ሺܰ, ܦܦሻ 
߳ேమ ൐ ߳ ൐ ߳ேభ ሺܯ, ܦܦሻ ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ and ሺܰ, ܦܫሻ 
߳ேభ ൐ ߳ ൐ ߳ெభ ሺܯ, ܦܦሻ ሺܰ, ܫܫሻ 
߳ெభ ൐ ߳ ൐ 0 ሺܯ, ܫܫሻ ሺܰ, ܫܫሻ 
 
We employ the following definition. 
Definition 1  
The investment cost is ‘low’ if  0 ൏ ߳ ൏ ߳ெభ , ‘intermediately low’ if ߳ெభ ൏ ߳ ൏ ߳ேభ, 
‘intermediately high’ if ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ ൏ ߳ேమ , and ‘high’ if ߳ ൐ ߳ேమ. 
The definition above facilitates our comparisons. Calculating the difference in profits, 
we find that ଵଶߎெ,ூூ ൐ ߨ௜ே,ூூ if the investment cost is low ሺ߳ெభ ൐ ߳ ൐ 0ሻ, as well as 
ଵ
ଶߎெ,஽஽ ൐
ߨ௜ே,஽஽ if the investment cost is high ሺ߳ ൐ ߳ேమሻ, indicating that a merger is always profitable 
given that the firms make the same innovation decisions post-merger. In other words, ሺܯ, ܫܫሻ 
and ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ are the SPNE outcomes when the investment cost is low and high, respectively.  
Turning to the case of intermediately low investment cost, straightforward calculation 
implies that ଵଶߎெ,஽஽ ൐ ߨ௜ே,ூூ. Thus, for given innovation decisions, “merger” is preferred to 
                                                 
10 To show that ߳ெభ ൏ ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ேమ , it is relatively straightforward to establish that ߳ேభ െ ߳ெభ ൐ 0 and ߳ேమ െ
߳ேభ ൐ 0. The result then follows immediately. 
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“no merger”, and ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ is the SPNE. Intuitively, when the firms stay independent, they 
tend to overinvest in R&D as a means of improving their competitive position. However, the 
overinvestment problem can be easily mitigated through a merger. This in turn helps firms 
internalize the concomitant negative externalities on their profits (business stealing and stra-
tegic overinvestment). 
When the investment cost is intermediately high, the firms can deviate from ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ to 
ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ or ሺܰ, ܦܫሻ, and vice versa. We find that ଵଶߎெ,஽஽ ൐ ߨ௝ே,ூ஽, indicating that firm j who 
does not innovate ሺܦሻ always wants to merge with firm i. For firm i, however, the decision of 
whether to merge or not is not clear-cut and may depend on the level of R&D efficiency, ݁. 
Specifically, we find that ଵଶߎெ,஽஽ ൐ ߨ௜ே,ூ஽ if ݁ ൐ ݁∗ሺߛሻ. Thus, when R&D is relatively ineffi-
cient, it is more profitable for firm i to merge with firm j, and ሺܯ, ܦܦሻ emerges in equilibri-
um.  
For higher levels of R&D efficiency, there are two possibilities. When 0 ൏ ݁ ൏ ݁∗ሺߛሻ, 
straightforward calculation suggests that there is a critical value of ߳, ߳ேయ ∈ ሺ߳ேభ, ߳ேమሻ such 
that ଵଶߎெ,஽஽ ൏ ߨ௜ே,ூ஽ if ߳ ൏ ߳ேయ; and 
ଵ
ଶߎெ,஽஽ ൐ ߨ௜ே,ூ஽ otherwise. This critical value is given 
by 
 ߳ேయ ൌ ௔మ൫଺ସ൫ଵି௘మ൯ି଼ఊమିସ௘ఊమሺଶିఊሻାସఊయିఊర൯ସሺଶାఊሻሺ଼ା଼௘ିఊమሻమ .        (6) 
The following proposition summarizes the analysis. 
Proposition 1  
(i) When the investment cost is low, ሺܯ, ܫܫሻ is the SPNE outcome.  
(ii) When the investment cost is intermediately low, ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ is the SPNE outcome.  
(iii) When the investment cost is intermediately high, there exists a critical value of the 
R&D efficiency ݁∗ሺߛሻ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ such that:  
 For ݁ ൐ ݁∗ሺߛሻ,	ሺܯ, ܦܦሻ is the SPNE outcome.  
 For 0 ൏ ݁ ൏ ݁∗ሺߛሻ , there is a critical value of the investment cost ߳ேయ ∈
ሺ߳ேభ, ߳ேమሻ , such that ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ  or ሺܰ, ܦܫሻ  is the SPNE outcome when ߳ ൏ ߳ேయ ; 
while ሺܯ, ܦܦሻ is the SPNE outcome when ߳ ൐ ߳ேయ .  
 The critical value ݁∗ሺߛሻ is decreasing in ߛ, డ௘∗ሺఊሻడఊ ൏ 0. 
(iv) When the investment cost is high, ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ is the SPNE outcome. 
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In the most interesting case where the efficiency of the new technology is relatively 
high (݁ ൏ ݁∗ሺߛሻ), the firms would prefer to stay independent provided that the investment 
cost is below a certain threshold (߳ ൏ ߳ேయ). The intuition is that firm i expects to gain more 
by competing with firm j and, through asymmetric technology choices, succeed in improving 
its position in the product market. Firm j, on the other hand, has an incentive to merge with 
firm i, as it does not undertake any R&D investments if the firms remain independent, mean-
ing that it suffers a lot in product-market competition. It is worth noting that, as ߛ rises, the 
goods become more homogeneous, and thus inter-firm competition intensifies. This naturally 
makes a merger more attractive as a means of relaxing the intensity of competition. Thus,  
݁∗ሺߛሻ tends to decline as ߛ rises, thereby expanding the set of ሼߛ, ݁ሽ configurations for which 
a merger is profitable. 
Overall, Proposition 1 suggests that when two conditions are met – the efficiency of the 
new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a certain level – the firms 
would prefer to stay independent. From prior studies we know that convex costs (Perry and 
Porter, 1985; Heywood and McGinty, 2008) as well as product differentiation (Lommerud 
and Sørgard, 1997; Hsu and Wang, 2010; Gelves, 2014) tend to increase firms’ merger incen-
tives. However, the current paper shows that, when the firms have the option to invest in a 
cost-reducing technology, a merger-to-monopoly is not a unique equilibrium outcome. Under 
certain conditions on the investment cost and the efficiency of the new technology, firms may 
prefer to stay separated, as part (iii) of Proposition 1 reports.11 
From Proposition 1 we can also see that the merged firm has generally weak innovation 
incentives.  
Corollary 1 
A merger tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently low.  
  This stems from the fact that the merged firm reduces its output. Any efficiency im-
provements are, therefore, applicable to less units of output – a lower incentive to invest in 
R&D.  
                                                 
11 As noted earlier, the decision of whether to merge or not precedes the innovation decision, as the former is 
typically a longer-term issue. Nonetheless, when the timing of the game is reversed and the firms decide first 
whether or not to adopt the new technology, we find that a merger is still not a unique SPNE outcome (provided 
that side payments are not permitted), which is consistent with Proposition 1. In particular, although ሺܯ, ܫܫሻ is 
preferred over ሺܰ, ܫܫሻ, and ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ yields higher profit than ሺܰ, ܦܦሻ, it can be shown that firm i who invests in 
R&D would prefer ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ over ሺܯ, ܫܦሻ when the efficiency of the new technology is not too low. 
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4. Extensions  
4.1  Asymmetric technology choices 
The analysis to this point has assumed that the merged firm is constrained to make the 
same investment decision for both its constituent divisions. This raises the question of wheth-
er Proposition 1 – especially the finding that a bilateral merger may not be profitable in part 
(iii) – continues to hold when the merged firm is no longer constrained by symmetric choices 
regarding its investment decisions. To shed some light on this issue, we re-conduct our analy-
sis and obtain the following equilibrium quantities and profits of the merged firm under 
asymmetric technology choices  
ݍଵெ,ூ஽ ൌ ௔ሺଶିఊሻଶሺଶାଶ௘ିఊమሻ, ݍଶெ,ூ஽ ൌ
௔ሺଵା௘ିఊሻ
ଶሺଶାଶ௘ିఊమሻ	, ߨଵெ,ூ஽ ൌ
௔మሺଶିఊሻ
ସሺଶାଶ௘ିఊమሻ െ ߳, and ߨଶெ,ூ஽ ൌ
௔మሺଵା௘ିఊሻ
ସሺଶାଶ௘ିఊమሻ.  (7) 
Using the profits in (7), we perform a comparison with the profits of the merged firm 
obtained in the two symmetric cases. To do this, define ߳ெమ to be the value of ߳ such that 
ߨ௜ெ,ூூ ൌ ߨ௜ெ,஽ூ, and ߳ெయ to be the value of ߳ such that ߨ௜ெ,஽஽ ൌ ߨ௜ெ,ூ஽. This leads to 
߳ெమ ൌ ௔మሺଵି௘మሻସሺଵା௘ାఊሻሺଶାଶ௘ିఊమሻ          (8) 
߳ெయ ൌ ௔మሺଵି௘ሻଶሺଶାఊሻሺଶାଶ௘ିఊమሻ.          (9) 
  Comparing ߳ெమ and ߳ெయ, we obtain ߳ெభ ൏ ߳ெమ ൏ ߳ெయ. It follows that if ߳ ൐ ߳ெయ, then 
both merged firms will not innovate and ሺܦ, ܦሻ is the equilibrium outcome; if ߳ெమ ൏ ߳ ൏ ߳ெయ, 
only one firm innovates and ሺܦ, ܫሻ, ሺܫ, ܦሻ are the outcomes; and if ߳ ൏ ߳ெమ , both merged 
firms innovate and ሺܫ, ܫሻ is the outcome. This implies that if ߳ belongs to ሺ߳ெమ, ߳ெయሻ, then the 
merger decision in Proposition 1 might be affected by asymmetric technology choices. 
  Comparing the values of the investment cost between the independent firms subgame 
and the merger subgame, we obtain 0 <  ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ேమ ழவ ߳ெమ <߳ெయ. Here it is interesting to note 
that the value ߳ெయ is always above (߳ேభ, ߳ேమ) – the interval within which a merger may not be 
profitable under symmetric technology choices. However, depending on the level of the R&D 
efficiency and the degree of product differentiation, it is possible that ߳ேమ ழவ ߳ெమ. In particular, 
߳ெమ  is above (߳ேభ , ߳ேమ) if ݁ ൐ ݁∗∗ሺߛሻ, while ߳ெమ	lies within the interval (߳ேభ , ߳ேమ ) if ݁ ൏
݁∗∗ሺߛሻ.  
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  First consider ߳ெమ ൐ ߳ேమ, which occurs when ݁ ൐ ݁∗∗ሺߛሻ. In this case, we can show 
that (i) both ሺܯ, ܫܫሻ and ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ are possible equilibrium outcomes when ߳ belongs to the in-
terval ሺ߳ேభ, ߳ேమሻ; (ii) both ሺܯ, ܫܫሻand ሺܰ, ܦܦሻ can arise in equilibrium when ߳  belongs to 
ሺ߳ேమ, ߳ெమሻ ; and (iii) both ሺܯ, ܫܦሻ  and ሺܰ, ܦܦሻ  are possible outcomes when ߳  belongs to 
ሺ߳ெమ, ߳ெయሻ. What this implies is that a merger might not be profitable even if asymmetric 
technology choices are permitted. Similarly, when ߳ெమ ൏ ߳ேమ, which arises if ݁ ൏ ݁∗∗ሺߛሻ, it 
can be shown that a merger is not a unique equilibrium outcome. By contrast, when ߳ lies 
within the interval ሺ0, ߳ேభሻ or when ߳ ൐ ߳ெయ, a merger is always profitable, results consistent 
with Proposition 1. Overall, these findings suggest that whether the merged firm is con-
strained or not in its ability to make asymmetric investment decisions across its constituent 
divisions leaves the merger decision largely unchanged. 
 
4.2 Side payments 
 One of key assumptions in our study is that a merger can only be realized under a unan-
imous agreement between firms in which no side payments are permitted. In that sense, our 
analysis can be seen as a variant of a voluntary collusive agreement. If we relax this assump-
tion by allowing side payments, it is relatively straightforward to show that a bilateral mer-
ger-to-monopoly is always profitable. This result, not new in the literature, follows from the 
fact that the decisions of the two independent firms can now be made by the merged firm, 
which maximizes total industry profits. In other words, a merger with side payments can al-
ways achieve higher profits compared to a duopoly. In addition, when side payments are al-
lowed, we find that a merger tends to discourage innovation under symmetric technology 
choices but tends to encourage innovation if technology choices are asymmetric. 
 
4.3 Complement goods 
Up until now the analysis has assumed that the firms produce substitute goods. When 
the products are complements, we find that the ranking of the values of the investment cost is 
reversed; that is, 0 ൏ ߳ேమ ൏ ߳ேభ ൏ ߳ெభ. This implies that the set of parameter configurations 
for which the merged firm innovates becomes larger and thus, compared to Corollary 1, a 
merger increases innovation incentives. At the same time, a merger is now always profitable. 
This follows from the fact that investing in R&D reduces cost and expands the demand for a 
firm’s own product. Given that the products are complements, an increase in the demand for 
firm i’s product has a positive spill-over effect on the demand for the product of firm j. This 
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positive externality in turn can be internalized through a merger, thereby encouraging the 
firms not only to integrate with each other through a merger but also to invest in R&D. We 
may conclude that the degree of product differentiation plays an important role for our key 
findings; when the goods are substitutes, it affects the merger decision for intermediately high 
investment cost, while switching from substitute to complement goods stimulates innovation 
and makes a merger always profitable. 
4.4 Price competition 
 In our baseline model the firms compete in quantities. When they compete in prices in-
stead, we find that for most parameter configurations (except if ݁ is sufficiently low and ߛ is 
sufficiently high), the results are qualitatively similar to our previous findings. More specifi-
cally, when the investment cost is low, a merger is always profitable and the merged firm in-
novates; that is, ሺܯ, ܫܫሻ is the SPNE outcome. When the investment cost is intermediately 
low, although a merger is still profitable, the merged firm does not innovate; the same is also 
true when the investment cost is high and therefore ሺܯ,ܦܦሻ is the outcome. By contrast, 
when the investment cost in intermediately high, there are circumstances in which a merger 
may not be profitable; such circumstances depend on the degree of product differentiation 
and the efficiency of the new technology. Overall, these results imply that when the firms 
compete in prices, a merger-to-monopoly may not always be profitable, thus lending support 
for our previous findings.  
4.5 Technological spillovers 
 The analysis so far has assumed that there are no spillover effects between firms. To 
check the sensitivity of our results to the presence of spillovers, we postulate that spillovers 
are involuntary in the sense that they represent leakages of information from one firm to an-
other without any compensation. This implies that a firm’s overall cost function can be writ-
ten out as ܥ௜ሺݍ௜ሻ ൌ ቀ݇௜ െ ߚ൫1 െ ௝݇൯ቁ ݍ௜ଶ ൅ ܨ௜, where ߚ  is the spillover rate and 1 െ ௝݇ is the 
extent of cost reduction of firm j.12 From the preceding analysis we know that when the effi-
ciency of the new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a certain lev-
el, the firms would prefer to stay independent and thus ሺܰ, ܫܦሻ emerges in equilibrium. It 
turns out that this outcome continues to hold provided that spillovers are sufficiently low. In-
tuitively, when spillovers are low, firm i – the sole innovator – can conceal most of its re-
                                                 
12 Here the effect of spillovers is to induce a (further) reduction in a firm’s marginal cost. 
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search output. Thus firm i has an incentive to remain independent when spillovers are suffi-
ciently low as doing so means that it can increase its success in the product market.  
4.6 Pre-merger market structure 
Finally, we checked the robustness of our results by allowing for a larger number of 
firms. A commonly encountered difficulty in the literature is to construct a model that over-
comes the merger paradox and thus yields sensible predictions for merger: (i) insiders gain, 
(ii) outsiders lose, (iii) the insiders produce more than the outsiders. Within a three-firm in-
dustry, we find that when all firms innovate, a bilateral merger becomes harmful for the in-
siders but beneficial for the outsider, if the products are sufficiently homogeneous and the 
new technology is relatively efficient. Intuitively, the market power effect of the merger 
(higher price and lower output) is to make the insiders less aggressive competitors. Because 
quantities are strategic substitutes, the implication of that is to expand the output of the out-
sider firm and, in turn, to increase its profit. Therefore, the net effect of the merger on the in-
siders’ profit becomes negative, provided that the goods are sufficiently homogeneous and 
the new technology is relatively efficient. Importantly, this finding is consistent with Proposi-
tion 1, which indicates that a merger is not a unique SPNE outcome. 
5. Conclusion 
Using a simple model, this paper investigates the interplay between merger and innova-
tion incentives in an industry with product differentiation. The analysis reveals that whether 
or not side payments between firms are allowed, a merger tends to discourage innovation, 
unless the investment cost is sufficiently low. This result has an Arrowian flavor in the sense 
that a merger-to-monopoly mostly weakens innovation incentives. Moreover, when side 
payments are permitted, a bilateral merger-to-monopoly is always profitable, a standard result 
in the literature. However, when side payments are not allowed and two conditions are met – 
the efficiency of the new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a par-
ticular level – the firms would prefer to stay independent, although they would enjoy signifi-
cant market power through a merger. 
The current study, like most that preceded it in industrial organization, is not without 
shortcomings. A potential limitation is that our model is stylized. Although we have attempt-
ed to relax some of its key assumptions, this will always be a difficult issue to address, given 
that the presence of three key parameters – the investment cost, the degree of product differ-
entiation and the new technology efficiency – do not permit the use of a more general setting. 
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Nonetheless, we believe that our results carry an important message, indicating that firms’ 
innovation decisions may be of profound importance for their decision to merge. Given that 
there are only a handful of studies on this topic, additional research is necessary to further our 
understanding. Future research might consider the role of heterogeneity, looking at how long-
lasting differences between firms may influence both their merger and innovation incentives. 
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